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Abstract 
Hannah Arendt’s claim that thinking is the last defense against the moral outrages of criminal political 
regimes sets the problematic of good and evil in relief. Human freedom, Paul Ricœur reminds us, is 
responsible for evil. The avowal of the evil of violence is thus the condition of our consciousness of the 
freedom to act anew. 
Aesthetic experience’s lateral transposition onto the planes of ethics and politics highlights our capacity to 
respond to exigencies in apposite ways.  Exemplary representations of the good, the right, and the justexpress 
a desire for being. Eros is accordingly the law of every work, word, deed, or act that answers to a difficulty, 
challenge, or crisis. Bound to living experiences, thought attains its true height through interrogating, 
demystifying, and vacating frozen norms, standards, and mores. Judgment actualizes thought’s liberating 
effects in answer to the demands of the situations in which we find ourselves. 
Keywords: Eros; Evil; Freedom; Philosophical Anthropology; Political Judgment; Phronesis; Reason; Reflective 
Judgment; Sensus Communis. 
Résumé 
L’affirmation d’Hannah Arendt selon laquelle la pensée est la dernière défense contre les outrages moraux 
des régimes politiques criminels met en relief la problématique du bien et du mal. La liberté humaine, nous 
rappelle Paul Ricœur, est responsable du mal. L’aveu du mal causé par la violence est donc la condition de la 
prise de conscience de notre liberté d’agir à nouveau. 
La transposition latérale de l’expérience esthétique sur les plans de l’éthique et de la politique met en évidence 
notre capacité à répondre aux exigences de manière appropriée. Les représentations exemplaires du bien, du 
droit et du juste expriment un désir d’être. Eros est donc la loi de toute œuvre, parole, action ou acte qui 
répond à une difficulté, un défi ou une crise. Liée aux expériences vécues, la pensée atteint sa véritable hauteur 
en interrogeant, démystifiant et rejetant les normes, les standards et les mœurs figés. Le jugement actualise 
les effets libérateurs de la pensée en réponse aux exigences des situations dans lesquelles nous nous trouvons. 
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By insisting that the activity of thinking is the last refuge against the wholesale adoption 
of values and customs that license the moral outrages of criminal political regimes, Hannah Arendt 
raises a formidable question that is no less pressing today. For her, the unprecedented rise to power 
of totalitarian systems shattered all traditional standards of conduct. To what, then, can we appeal 
in the absence of moral tenets, principles, and mores that would provide an adequate measure for 
judging the moral and political depravity of totalitarian rule? Arendt’s conviction that thought—
or more pointedly, “thinking without a banister”1—is the only safeguard against the ease with 
which, according to her, German Nationalist Socialism supplanted traditional moral precepts 
places the capacity to think at the root of our responsibility to assess the situation in which we find 
ourselves and to pursue the appropriate course of action in response to injustices, abuses of power, 
and outright violence. Can we then determine what the particular situation requires of us without 
our judgment as to the appropriate course of action itself becoming a matter of mere opinion, 
individual preference, or personal predilection? 
The notion that we are capable of responding to exigencies and demands in morally and 
politically responsible ways sets the place that judgment has in distinguishing good from evil in 
relief. Arendt’s contention that only good is radical, and Paul Ricœur’s conviction that only the 
good as exemplified in works, words, deeds, and lives enhances our capacity to act in accordance 
with it stand as ripostes to the claim that evil is as or more originary than good or that instances of 
evil provide models that we could imitate in the sense of following after them. By asking how 
Arendt’s contention and Ricœur’s conviction bear on their respective views of the power of 
judgment, I intend to relate the activity of thinking as Arendt describes it to our capacity to reply 
to exigencies and demands in singularly fitting ways. Ricœur’s remarks on aesthetic experience’s 
lateral transposition onto the planes of ethics and politics provides a critical touchstone in this 
regard. For a theory of political judgment for which reflective judgment is the key, his claim that 
only expressions of the good augment the field of our experiences opens the door to a broader 
consideration of Arendt’s assertion that evil has neither a root nor an essence of which thought 
could take hold. Arendt’s recourse to reflective judgment acquires its broader amplitude in light of 
Ricœur’s reflections on the work of an imagination that invites us to think more. The miracle that 
for her attests to the capacity to begin something new consequently assumes its practical efficacy 
only through the manner in which historical actors reply to exigencies and demands in ways 
befitting the situations in which they find themselves. 
 
1 Hannah Arendt, Thinking Without a Banister. Essays in Understanding 1953-1975, ed. Jerome Kohn (New 
York: Schocken, 2018); see Tama Weisman, Hannah Arendt and Karl Marx. On Totalitarianism and the 
Tradition of Western Political Thought (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2014), 16. For Arendt, the inability of 
the western tradition of political thought “to respond adequately to emerging and previously unheard of 
conditions” (16) of totalitarianism required that one think without the support of traditional standards. 
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I therefore propose to proceed by first considering how the freedom inhering in the 
capacity to begin something new might relate to the idea that good is more originary than evil. The 
quest for meaning, which Arendt points out “appears in Socrates’ language as love, that is, love in 
its Greek significance of Erōs,”2 here provides a guide. By insisting that the activity of thinking 
addresses itself to “such concepts as justice, happiness, and virtue,”3 Arendt highlights how the 
expression in language of the meaning of the experiences occasioned by the events we set in motion 
or undergo accompanies the activity of living. Since, as she tells us, “[n]o language has a ready-
made vocabulary for the needs of mental activity,”4 I will relate the activity of thinking to reflective 
judgment by way of the imagination’s schematizing power. Turning to the love of wisdom 
provides an occasion for considering anew thought’s relation to the ways that works, words, deeds, 
and acts give a figure to the desire for being. Drawing upon the exemplarity of works of art, I 
therefore propose to attribute the ability to distinguish right from wrong to the exercise of 
prudential wisdom instructed by examples of the good, the right, and the just. 
I. Thinking and Judging 
The capacity for discerning what, in the midst of changing circumstances and exigencies, 
is the right, better, or in some cases the least harmful course of action immediately brings to the 
fore how the freedom inhering in the power to begin something new is bound up with the ability 
to scrutinize and critique established precepts and conventions. This power, Arendt reminds us, 
actualizes the condition of natality, where each of us is a new beginning by reason of our births. 
Everything new, she emphasizes, “always happens against the overwhelming odds of statistical 
laws and their probability.”5 Discoveries and sometimes infinitely improbable innovations in 
artistic and scientific endeavors as well as in the field of praxis thus appear in the likeness of 
miracles. Our capacity to set a new course of events in motion in the midst of a history in which 
we are caught up is thus the first indication of how the freedom inhering in this capacity draws its 
meaning and force from the ability to discern what the situation requires and to respond in a 
singularly appropriate way. 
That the love of beauty, wisdom, and justice gives rise to the “wind of thought”6 places the 
activity of thinking in relief. For Arendt, “[b]ecause thought’s quest is a kind of desirous love, the 
 
2 Hannah Arendt, The Life of the Mind. Volume One, Thinking (San Diego: Harcourt Brace, 1978), 178. 
3 Arendt, The Life of the Mind. Volume One, Thinking, 178. 
4 Arendt, The Life of the Mind. Volume One, Thinking, 102; see Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method, 
trans. Joel Weinsheimer and Donald G. Marshall, 2nd ed. (New York: Crossroad, 1989), 75; Paul Ricœur, 
The Rule of Metaphor. Multi-Disciplinary Studies of the Creation of Meaning in Language, trans. Robert 
Czerny, Kathleen McLaughlin and John Costello (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1977). 
5 Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958), 178; see Philip Walsh, 
Arendt Contra Sociology. Theory, Society, and its Science (London: Routledge, 2015), 59. 
6 Arendt, The Life of the Mind. Volume One, Thinking, 193. 
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objects of thought can only be lovable things—beauty, wisdom, justice, and so on.”7 As the work 
of art’s immediate source, this “human capacity for thought”8 transforms these objects in the case 
of poetry, narrative fictions, musical compositions and the like into world-producing things. 
Hence, “[u]gliness and evil are almost by definition excluded from the thinking concern.”9 In 
Arendt’s view, Socrates “believed no one could do evil voluntarily,”10 since like ugliness, evil has 
no root of its own and no essence of which thought could get hold. Socrates, she tells us, apparently 
therefore “had nothing more to say about the connection between evil and the lack of thought than 
that people who are not in love with beauty, justice, and wisdom are incapable”11 of it. 
Why, then, might “those who are in love with examining [received opinion, criteria, values, 
and standards] and thus ‘do philosophy’”12 be incapable of intentionally committing evil acts, as 
Socrates says according to Arendt? Putting received opinion to the test in order to think more has 
an initially destructive effect. Our experiences are a guide to thinking in this regard. Hans-Georg 
Gadamer reminds us that “[e]very experience worthy of the name thwarts an expectation”13 based 
on accumulated habits, customs, and mores. Moreover, every experience in which we are 
confronted with a difficulty, dilemma, or crisis for which there is no obvious precedent or ready 
solution confronts us with the question, how must I respond? As regards artistic creations, genius, 
Kant says, “is the talent … that gives the rule to art.”14 Here the capacity for thought, which for 
Arendt is “by its very nature … world-open and communicative,”15 acquires its specific concretion 
in the way that a work expresses the “idea” exemplified by it. When it comes to the field of our 
practical experiences, could we not say that phronesis, which Aristotle tells us is a virtue that cannot 
be taught, similarly rests on the ability to reply in a singularly fitting way to a dilemma, difficulty, 
or crisis as apprehended by the agent? Ricœur explains that the tie established by Aristotle between 
phronesis and phronimos (“the man of phronesis”16) is meaningful only if this person “of wise 
judgment determines at the same time the rule and the case, by grasping the situation in its 
 
7 Arendt, The Life of the Mind. Volume One, Thinking, 179; see Hannah Arendt, Love and Saint Augustine, 
ed. Joanna Vecchiarelli Scott and Judith Chelius Stark (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996), 9; 
Paul Ricœur, Figuring the Sacred. Religion, Narrative, and Imagination, ed. Mark I. Wallace, trans. David 
Pellauer (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1995). Ricœur remarks that love “is initially a discourse of praise 
where, in praising, one rejoices over the view of one object set above all other objects of one’s concern” 
(317). 
8 Hannah Arendt, Reflections on Literature and Culture, ed. Susannah Young-Ah Gottlieb (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 2007), 173. For Arendt, art works are “thought things” (173). Accordingly, she points 
out that workmanship “makes the thought a reality and fabricates things of thought” (173). 
9 Arendt, The Life of the Mind. Volume One, Thinking, 179. 
10 Arendt, The Life of the Mind. Volume One, Thinking, 179. 
11 Arendt, The Life of the Mind. Volume One, Thinking, 179. 
12 Arendt, The Life of the Mind. Volume One, Thinking, 179; see 175. 
13 Gadamer, Truth and Method, 356. 
14 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Judgment, trans. Werner S. Pluhar (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1987), 174. 
15 Arendt, Reflections on Literature and Culture, 173. 
16 Paul Ricœur, Oneself as Another, trans. Kathleen Blamey (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992), 
174. 
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singularity.”17 Aristotle, he tells us moreover, “does not hesitate to compare this singular nature of 
choice in accordance with phronēsis to perception (aisthēsis) in the theoretical dimension.”18 The 
ability to respond to practical exigencies and demands is accordingly the vis-à-vis of the talent for 
discovering the right word, turn of phrase, narrative configuration, or musical expression in 
response to a problem or challenge as the poet, story teller, or composer apprehended it. 
Highlighting the kinship between the talent that gives the rule to art and a virtue that 
manifests itself in exemplary words, deeds, and acts in this way brings to the fore the imagination’s 
creatively productive role. Aesthetic experience’s lateral transposition onto the planes of ethics and 
politics places the conjunction of thinking and judging under the aegis of reflective judgment in 
this regard. The synthetic operation that in the case of a narrative or a piece of music, for example, 
renders the work communicable through drawing a configuration from heterogeneous elements 
owes its force to an art that for Kant is “concealed in the depth of the human soul.”19 This operation 
is the bass note of the imagination’s productive, medial role. Ricœur emphasizes how, for instance, 
the intentional structure of the power of knowing rests on the unity of appearances and meanings. 
Through bringing into focus the disproportion “between the word that speaks of being and truth, 
and the gaze tethered to appearance and perspective,”20 a transcendental critique of the power of 
knowing places the imagination’s operative role on stage. In turn, the affirmation that in speaking 
about the world takes the form of the consciousness of it places the imagination’s schematizing 
power at the root of the truth intention of discourse broadly conceived.  
Far from consigning this intention to the metaphysics of presence, the schematizing 
operation on which the structure of consciousness depends inscribes itself within the activity of 
thinking. Ricœur remarks that Jacques Derrida’s stroke of genius was to enter the “domain of 
metaphor not by way of its birth but … by way of its death,”21 thereby exposing how the 
dissimulation of metaphysics’ alleged metaphorical origin effects the drift toward idealization that 
puts into play the metaphysical oppositions between nature and freedom, history and spirit, the 
sensible and the spiritual or intelligible as well as sense or meaning. The complicity between the 
wearing-away of metaphor, where the primary philosophemes such as eidos, logos, and theoria that 
define the field of metaphysical thought assume their “proper” meaning, and the raising up of 
metaphysics, however, is not the final word. To be sure, this transference of the sensible to the 
nonsensible governs the system of Western metaphysical thought. Ricœur, however, stresses that 
the “effectiveness of dead metaphor can be inflated … only in semiotic conceptions that impose the 
primacy of denomination, and hence of [the] substitution of meaning.”22 By affecting the copula in 
its relational function—as for example when the verb to be connects the predicate “temple” to the 
 
17 Ricœur, Oneself as Another, 175. 
18 Ricœur, Oneself as Another, 175. 
19 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Norman Kemp Smith (New York/London: St. Martin’s 
Press/Macmillan, 1929), 183; see Hannah Arendt, Lectures on Kant’s Political Philosophy, ed. Ronald 
Beiner (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982), 81. 
20 Paul Ricœur, Philosophical Anthropology. Writings and Lectures, Volume 3, ed. Johann Michel and Jérôme 
Porée, trans. David Pellauer (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2016), 7. 
21 Ricœur, The Rule of Metaphor, 285. 
22 Ricœur, The Rule of Metaphor, 290. 
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subject “nature” in the poetic statement “nature is a temple where living columns …”23—the use 
of bizarre predicates brings to the fore poetic discourse’s existential aim. The critical incision of the 
literal “is not” in the metaphorical reference to nature’s living columns consequently liberates the 
truth intention of this poetic statement from habituated ways of thinking and feeling. 
Does the recovery of this truth intention beyond the deconstruction of metaphysical 
thought not also return thought to this field of play? Every proposal of meaning by a poem, literary 
fiction, musical composition, or theatrical performance raises a claim to truth. The truth intention 
of poetic discourse widely conceived thus bears out the power of the imagination at work. Through 
augmenting the ways available to us for inscribing our lives in the web of human affairs, fictive 
explorations of modes of thinking, feeling, and acting accordingly open the world to us and us to 
the world anew. We could therefore ask if our receptivity to the rule that in the case of the work 
stands as testament to its worlding power is also the requisite condition of the work’s enlargement 
of the possibilities available to us for inserting ourselves in the world. These “thought experiments” 
in the mediums of words, sounds, and visual displays invite us to think more. Should we then not 
also say that the power of imagination is vital to the activity that we carry on in the solitude of the 
company we each keep with ourselves? 
II. The Love of Wisdom 
By crediting the significance of works and acts that respond to exigencies and demands in 
exemplary ways to the imagination’s schematizing power, I want to search out how the love of 
beauty, wisdom, and justice figures in a theory of political judgment for which the matter of taste 
serves as the guide. In attempting to bring together an Aristotelian conception of judgment in 
which phronesis plays a critical role and a Kantian understanding of judgment’s place in cultivating 
an “enlarged mentality,” Arendt provides a framework for inquiring into the faculty of judgment’s 
moral and political dimensions. Seyla Benhabib remarks that Arendt “herself was misled in these 
matters by a quasi-intuitionalist concept of moral conscience on the one hand and an unusually 
narrow concept of morality on the other.”24 Moreover, Benhabib stresses that Arendt’s reflections 
vacillate between judgment as a moral faculty and judgment as a retrospective one. Arendt’s 
concern with “judgment as the faculty of ‘telling right from wrong,’”25 and her focus on judgment’s 
orientation toward the past sets historical actors’ perspectives against those of world historical 
spectators.26 By taking the love of beauty, wisdom, and justice as a starting point, I intend to relate 
reflective judgment’s prospective dimension to exemplary deeds, acts, and lives that appear in the 
likeness of miracles. By preserving something of the “thought experiments” that in the case of 
fiction, poetry, music, and works of art renew the real in accordance with the worlds they project, 
 
23 Charles Baudelaire, cited in Ricœur, Rule of Metaphor, 247; see Charles Baudelaire, “Correspondences,” 
in Flowers of Evil, trans. James McGowan (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), 19. 
24 Seyla Benhabib, “Judgment and the Moral Foundations of Politics in Hannah Arendt’s Thought,” in Ronald 
Beiner and Jennifer Nedelsky (eds), Judgment, Imagination, and Politics. Themes from Kant and Arendt 
(London: Rowman & Littlefield, 2001), 183-204, here 185. 
25 Benhabib, “Judgment and the Moral Foundations of Politics in Hannah Arendt’s Thought,” 184. 
26 See Paul Ricœur, The Just, trans. David Pellauer (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000), 103-7. 
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aesthetic experience’s lateral transposition onto the planes of ethics and politics provides a key to 
how these miracles are signs and ciphers of our capacity for surpassing the real from within. 
The myth of the birth of Eros is instructive in this regard. The offspring of Poros and Penia, 
Eros is born of a principle of abundance from the womb of impoverishment. Eros, Ricœur 
accordingly tells us, “carries in himself that original wound which is the emblem of his mother, 
Penia.”27 The “hybrid of Richness and Poverty,”28 Eros personifies the soul of the philosopher who 
desires the good that she in herself is not. The ontic poverty that Ricœur explains constitutes the 
root of the account of the aspiration for being is the emblem of the deficiency that places its negative 
stamp on the part we have in it. The philosophy of fallibility that in his analysis of the “originarily 
dialectical structure of human reality”29 Ricœur relates to the disproportion between 1) one’s 
perspective and the truth intention of discourse, 2) one’s character and the totality adumbrated by 
the idea of the person, and 3) vital desires and happiness uncovers the tie between this aspiration 
for being and the impulse to create something new. From this vantage point, all “creation, all 
ποίησις (poíisis), is an effect of Eros.”30 Eros is accordingly the law of every work that, born of 
desire, is replete with a “richness of Meaning and [the] poverty of brute Appearance.”31 This Eros, 
which “goes toward being [, …] also … recalls being as its Origin.”32 Ricœur here cites Plato: “The 
cause of anything whatever that emerges from non-being into being is always an act of creation.”33 
Every such act brings about an increase in being in response to a question, dilemma, or difficulty 
as apprehended by the artist or social, political, or historical agent. Innovations in artistic as well 
as social, moral, and political realms consequently augment dimensions of our experiences in 
answer to the ontic indigence that places its seal on our intermediary condition.  
Is the love of beauty, wisdom, and justice also then the spring of thought? Elsewhere, I 
drew on aesthetic experience’s lateral transposition onto the planes of ethics and politics to extend 
the analogy of the work’s fittingness to exemplary moral and political acts. There, I argued that 
initiatives that reply to exigencies and demands concretize reason through vesting it with its 
historical, juridical, and political specificity.34 Normative claims are indices of the kinds of 
expectations that fuel struggles for recognition, rights, and equitable shares in social goods in this 
regard. These normative expectations thus stand as the riposte to the moral harm, systemic 
injustices, and weaponization of crises of legitimation that infect the body politic. The “very 
 
27 Paul Ricœur, Fallible Man, trans. Charles A. Kelbley (New York: Fordham University Press, 1986), 10; see 
Ricœur, Philosophical Anthropology, 4. 
28 Ricœur, Fallible Man, 10. 
29 Ricœur, Philosophical Anthropology, 3. 
30 Ricœur, Fallible Man, 10. 
31 Ricœur, Fallible Man, 10. 
32 Ricœur, Fallible Man, 102. 
33 Plato, cited in Ricœur, Fallible Man, 10; see Plato, “Symposium,” in Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns 
(eds), The Collected Dialogues Including the Letters, trans. Michael Joyce (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1962), 557. 
34 Roger W. H. Savage, Paul Ricœur’s Philosophical Anthropology as Hermeneutics of Liberation (New York: 
Routledge, 2021). 
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belonging of existence to the being whose thinking is reason”35 is itself nourished by aspirations, 
desires, and needs to which the thirst for meaning gives rise. Exemplary words, works, deeds, and 
acts through which we insert ourselves in the world are therefore manifest signs of reason’s 
inscription in the ways in which we respond to difficulties, crises, and challenges requiring and 
even demanding that we think more and judge well. 
Should we then place the activity over which reason ostensibly rules under the aegis of the 
good, the right, and the just? We have to admit that ideas of the good, the right, and the just are as 
diverse as the axiological systems of the cultural traditions from which they arise. At the same time, 
what bearing would these ideas have on the ways that we and others conduct our lives apart from 
the note of sanction they place on the work we undertake in making the life given to us our own? 
Ricœur stresses that the word “life” acquires the “appreciative, evaluative dimension of ergon 
[work]”36 when the practices and skills we develop as musicians, doctors, or architects, for 
example, qualify this life. Placing the perfection of this specifically human work under the aegis of 
happiness distinguishes the love of beauty, wisdom, and justice from the pursuit of bodily and 
social pleasures in this regard. Ricœur explains that the “polarity of ἐπιθυμία (épithumía) and ἔρωϛ 
(eros)”37 internally divides the perfection of these partial pleasures from happiness. Happiness, 
which according to Aristotle is the “desirable in itself,”38 thus perfects the work we undertake in 
quest of the life we claim as our own. Reason, Ricœur therefore tells us, has the same breadth as 
happiness, since the supreme good that places its seal of perfection on the intended aim of the good 
life is at the same time an idea from which the demand for totality springs. 
By maintaining that ideas of the good, the right, and the just are given by example, I want 
to draw out how the rule summoned by a case acquires its prospective dimension. Ricœur reminds 
us that Kant invokes the “power of imagination ‘to present’ (Darstellung) ideas of reason for which 
we have no concept”39 in order to account for aesthetic productions of genius. For Kant, the 
imagination sets thought to work because there is no concept adequate to an aesthetic idea’s 
representation in the medium of the work. Kant emphasizes that this aesthetic representation 
“cannot be completely compassed and made intelligible by language.”40 Gadamer similarly 
reminds us that the meaning of a work cannot be recuperated conceptually.41 Through conferring 
the “ability to think further”42 on thought, the imagination proves to be the spring of the power for 
running ahead of the real. For, by bringing “the faculty of intellectual ideas (the reason) into 
 
35 Ricœur, Fallible Man, 103; cf. Alain Badiou, Plato’s Republic. A Dialogue in Sixteen Chapters, trans. Susan 
Spitzer (New York: Columbia University Press, 2013). 
36 Ricœur, Oneself as Another, 177; see Ricœur, Fallible Man, 94. 
37 Ricœur, Fallible Man, 93. 
38 Aristotle, cited by Ricœur, Fallible Man, 96; see Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, trans. Martin Ostwald 
(Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1962), 14-9. 
39 Paul Ricœur, Hermeneutics. Writing and Lectures, Volume 2, trans. David Pellauer (Cambridge: Polity, 
2013), 151. 
40 Kant, cited by Ricœur in Hermeneutics, 151; see Kant, Critique of Judgment, 182. 
41 Hans-Georg Gadamer, The Relevance of the Beautiful and Other Essays, ed. Robert Bernasconi, trans. 
Nicholas Walker (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 33. 
42 Ricœur, Hermeneutics, 151. 
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movement by a representation,”43 the creatively productive imagination occasions more than can 
be grasped in it.  
Aesthetic experience’s lateral transposition onto the planes of ethics and politics brings to 
the fore the conjunction of the work’s singularity, exemplarity, and communicability in this regard. 
The difference between determinative and reflective judgment here proves to be crucial. The 
reversal of direction of the act of subsumption that in determinative judgment places the individual 
case under an already established rule vests aesthetic judgment with its distinctive force. Hence, in 
aesthetic judgment, “one ‘seeks’ the appropriate rule under which to place the singular 
experience.”44 The relation of singularity, communicability, and claim to universality evidenced 
by the work’s worlding power offers a unique point of access to the phenomenon of testimony. The 
testimony given by exemplary deeds, acts, and lives, we could even say, is analogous to a work’s 
claim to truth. This testimony similarly puts into play the singularity, communicability, and claim 
to universality that in the case of the work is the vis-à-vis of the reader, listener, or spectator’s 
apprehension of the meaning intended by it. In the case of words, works, deeds, acts, and lives 
attesting to “an intention, an inspiration, an idea at the heart of experience and history which 
nonetheless transcend experience and history,”45 this conjunction of singularity, communicability, 
and claim to universality is the sine qua non of a hermeneutics of testimony that for Ricœur is 
tantamount to a project of liberation under the name of the absolute. The moral or political effect 
of being drawn to follow the example set by the act, which he stresses is the analogical equivalent 
of the work’s communicability, turns our regard for words, works, deeds, acts, and lives that we 
admire toward future expectations. The testimony given by words, deeds, acts, and lives in answer 
to social, moral, and political difficulties, dilemmas, and crises thus stands as the demonstration 
and proof of ideas of reason that sanction the creative themes with which we engage in quest of 
our common humanity.46 
The problem that Ricœur tells us the exemplarity of the singular work or act poses for him 
thus opens a line of inquiry into the way that the work or act’s communicability vests reflective 
judgment with its prospective dimension. Like a work, which presents the idea exemplified by it 
through figuring this idea in the medium of words, sounds, or textural materials, the historical 
testimony of words, deeds, and acts is also “a ‘presentation,’ an ‘exhibition’ [Darstellung] of what 
for reflection remains an idea.”47 An excessive disjunction between the prospective and 
retrospective dimensions of the power of judging obviates how “the ability to think from the 
standpoint of everyone else”48 draws its force from the effect of being drawn to follow exemplary 
models proffered by individual works and acts. The capacity to receive the injunction proceeding 
 
43 Kant, cited by Ricœur in Hermeneutics, 151, n. 29; see Kant, Critique of Judgment, 183. 
44 Ricœur, The Just, 95. 
45 Paul Ricœur, Essays on Biblical Interpretation, ed. Lewis Seymour Mudge (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 
1980), 78. 
46 Cf. Badiou, Plato’s Republic. By identify the fifth form of government that in this hypertranslation of Plato’s 
Republic he names communism with the Idea of Truth, Badiou trades on the way that ideas of reason 
sanction these creative themes. 
47 Ricœur, Hermeneutics, 151. 
48 Ricœur, The Just, 105. 
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from the example, kin to the act of “being-enjoined by the Other,”49 is consequently the condition 
of a cosmopolitan view instructed by ideas of reason for which no one concept of the good, the 
right, and the just suffices. 
By suggesting that the ability to think is the counterpart of this receptivity to moral and 
political injunctions, I am clearly looking to the idea of humanity as a way to account for how an 
activity that is carried on in solitude could countermand the moral outrages of criminal political 
regimes. This idea is the ground of the imperative of respect. If, as Ricœur points out, an ethics 
without an ontology would be stripped of its root in a philosophical anthropology, the task of 
humanity—that is, the task of realizing our common humanity since it is given nowhere but 
through the idea of it—rests on the capacities inscribed in the human condition.50 These capacities 
(the capacity to act with others, to remember, to tell one’s own story, to hold oneself to account for 
one’s actions, and to be receptive to the injunction coming from the Other) are the 
phenomenological correlates of the ontological constitution of human being. Respect, Ricœur 
reminds us, “makes possible the practical representation of human beings who have value and are 
filled with meaning”51 by conferring on each an inestimable worth. The imperative to treat oneself 
and others not as a means but as an end thus acquires its normative force only in light of the moral 
expectation of the recognition of the humanity of all. 
III. Freedom of Thought 
That the normative requirement of respect draws its force from the moral expectation of 
recognition brings the intermediary condition of the being that we are into view. For a 
philosophical anthropology for which the pathétique of human misery is the inexhaustible source, 
the notion of being as power and act acquires its practical and affective dimensions in light of this 
condition. The disproportion of the “self within itself”52 that for Ricœur is the source of our 
originary fragility marks the place of the transcending intention that makes human being 
intermediary between the poles of finitude and infinitude. As I noted previously, the disproportion 
between one’s finite perspective and the truth intention of discourse, one’s character and the 
practical totality at which the work (ergon) we undertake aims, and vital wants and happiness in 
each case has as its vis-à-vis the medial term that Ricœur respectively identifies with the 
transcendental imagination, the idea of respect, and the human heart (θυμός). The transcending 
intention that at each stage of his analysis vests these medial terms with their meaning and force is 
accordingly the sign of the will, effort, and desire to be. 
By attributing the freedom of thought to this transcending intention, I want to highlight 
how what for Arendt is the last refuge of moral judgment is rooted in the ontological constitution 
 
49 Ricœur, Oneself as Another, 351. 
50 Paul Ricœur, Lectures on Ideology and Utopia, ed. George H. Taylor (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1986), 253; see Paul Ricœur, “Ethics and Human Capability. A Response,” in John Wall, William 
Schweiker and W. David Hall (eds), Paul Ricœur and Contemporary Moral Thought (New York: Routledge, 
2002), 284. 
51 Ricœur, Philosophical Anthropology, 14. 
52 Ricœur, Philosophical Anthropology, 19. 
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of human being. When, previously, I remarked on how the truth intention of discourse confounds 
the system of transference that governs Western metaphysical thought, I noted how the critical 
incision of the “is not” in the use of bizarre predicates turns against the wearing-away of the 
metaphorical attributes of the primary philosophemes. By preserving the tension between the 
literal and figurative meanings in a metaphorical statement, this critical incision sets thought to 
work. The predicative assimilation of semantically incongruent terms produces a new meaning as 
when, for example, we see a ceasefire agreement as if it were demolished by the storm of the 
warring factions’ violations. Accordingly, we resolve the enigma of this emergent meaning’s iconic 
presentation each time we grasp the intended meaning as displayed in the thickness of the 
imagining scene.53 The icon of the image, which Ricœur explains is nothing other than the 
“schematization of metaphorical attribution,”54 is the matrix of the new predicative pertinence 
drawn from the literal ruins of the initial semantic clash. The creativity of language here bespeaks 
the freedom inhering in the power to shatter congealed systems of meaning and to refashion our 
understandings and outlooks through producing something new. The capacity to reply to 
questions or problems in singularly fitting ways, as when the words of the poet give voice to a 
modality of being in a manner that only they can, is consequently the spring of the miracle for 
surpassing or transcending from within the given order of the practical field. 
How, then, does the activity that in her analysis of the human condition Arendt sets against 
the specifically political activities of speaking and acting stand as surety of the freedom that she 
tells us depends upon the presence and equality of others?55 The capacity that for Kant enables 
each of us “to think from the standpoint of everyone else”56 for her liberates us from our private 
perspectives. Exchanging the “standpoint given to us by nature for that of someone else, with 
whom we share the same world”57 thus enlarges our way of seeing it. Arendt tells us that Aristotle 
distinguishes between phronesis and the wisdom of philosophers on the basis of this ability to 
acquire “the greatest possible overview of all the possible standpoints.”58 The cardinal political 
virtue of phronesis, she adds, is hardy mentioned at all prior to Kant’s discussion of the sensus 
communis, where we encounter it again as it relates to the faculty of judging individual cases in the 
absence of established norms, standards, and rules. 
Does putting ourselves in the positions of everyone else in order, as Kant says, to compare 
“our own judgment with human reason in general and thus escape the illusion that arises from the 
ease of mistaking subjective and private conditions for objective ones”59 in the end authorize 
supplanting measured opinions and considered convictions with some normative idea of reason 
 
53 Ricœur, The Rule of Metaphor, 214; see Paul Ricœur, “The Metaphorical Process as Cognition, Imagination, 
and Feeling,” Critical Inquiry, vol. 5/1 (1978), 148-51. 
54 Paul Ricœur, A Ricœur Reader. Reflection and Imagination, ed. Mario J. Valdés (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 1991), 126. 
55 Arendt, The Human Condition; see Weisman, Hannah Arendt and Karl Marx, 16-9. 
56 Kant, Critique of Judgment, 160; see Hannah Arendt, The Promise of Politics, ed. Jerome Kohn (New York: 
Schocken, 2005), 160. 
57 Arendt, The Promise of Politics, 168. 
58 Arendt, The Promise of Politics, 168. 
59 Kant, Critique of Judgment, 160. 
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or truth? The “non-political, and, potentially even anti-political nature of truth”60 that for Arendt 
sets it apart from the political realm for her acquires its real political significance in light of the need 
for an impartial judiciary and institutions that safeguard the search for and interpretation of facts 
outside struggles for power. As the “polis’s most determined and most influential opponent,”61 
Plato never dreamed that the political realm would realize this need.62 Arendt moreover remarks 
that the political virtue of phronesis has hardly any place in Kant’s political philosophy. All the 
same, for her, “the real political faculty in Kant’s philosophy is not lawgiving reason, but 
judgment.”63  
The “split within the idea of subsumption”64 that Ricœur explains distinguishes aesthetic 
judgment from determinative judgment proves to be critical in this regard, since it entails reversing 
the way that in determinative judgment the case is placed under a rule. In Albrecht Wellmer’s view, 
the term reflective judgment is rendered somewhat deceptively when it is used in this way.65 
Nevertheless, he also points out that defining the term in opposition to determinative judgment’s 
act of subsumption has a distinctive advantage in that it highlights the imagination’s productive 
role. Like Wellmer, Benhabib recognizes how for Arendt reflective judgment provides the key to 
what Kant calls an enlarged mentality. According to Benhabib, Arendt consequently “discovered 
a procedure for ascertaining subjective agreement in the public realm”66 through extending 
reflective judgment’s operative significance beyond the aesthetic domain. However, we should ask 
whether a critical faculty that “in reflecting takes account (a priori), in our thought, of everyone 
else’s way of presenting [something], in order as it were to compare our own judgment with human 
reason in general,”67 as Kant says, depends first on the communicability of the rule exemplified by 
the singular case. In the realm of aesthetic experience, the capacity for apprehending the rule 
exemplified by the work is the condition of the work’s success in giving voice to the truth to which 
 
60 Hannah Arendt, Between Past and Future. Eight Exercises in Political Thought (New York: Penguin Books, 
1968), 260. 
61 Arendt, Between Past and Future, 260. 
62 Arendt, Between Past and Future, 260; cf. Badiou, Plato’s Republic. In Badiou’s hypertranslation, Socrates 
states: “There are two main types of mental activity: opinion, whose objects are the changes in the 
given realm, and thought, which is concerned with transworld being… Opinion is divided into assumption 
and certainty, while thought is either analytic or dialectical” (238). Contrariwise, for Arendt, “every claim 
in the sphere of human affairs to an absolute truth, whose validity needs no support from the side of 
opinion, strikes at the very root of all politics and all governments” (233). 
63 Arendt, The Promise of Politics, 169. 
64 Ricœur, The Just, 95. 
65 Albrecht Wellmer, “Hannah Arendt on Judgment. The Unwritten Doctrine of Reason,” in Ronald Beiner and 
Jennifer Nedelsky (eds), Judgment, Imagination, and Politics. Themes from Kant and Arendt, 170. 
According to Wellmer, Arendt “wanted to preserve the internal relationship between judgment and 
discursive reason, that is, to preserve judgment as a rational faculty” (165). 
66 Seyla Benhabib, The Reluctant Modernism of Hannah Arendt (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2000), 189. 
Benhabib at the same time remarks that the hermeneutic puzzle stemming from Arendt’s incomplete 
reflections on judgment “arises from three sets of claims that … stand in tension with each other” (173). 
67 Kant, Critique of Judgment, 160; see Wellmer, “Hannah Arendt on Judgment,” 171. Wellmer cites the 
translation of this passage from Immanuel Kant, The Critique of Judgment, trans. James Creed Meredith 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1952), 151. 
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it lays claim. In each case, the claim to universality that is the counterpart of the work’s singularity 
broadens and deepens the field of representations in which diverse expressions of humanity rooted 
in different histories and cultural traditions figure. 
Setting the concrete universality of the sensus communis against reason’s abstract 
universality brings the mode of representation appropriate to reflective judgment into view. The 
sensus communis, which Gadamer emphasizes founds community and gives the will to live together 
its direction, has its express articulation in the symbolic order of the cultural system that structures 
its social, religious, and political bonds.68 Moreover, the freedom to think, from which for him we 
cannot turn away69—inheres in every experience that puts the given order of existence into 
question. Every such experience is one that is brought to language. Language, Gadamer 
accordingly tells us, is not just one of our possessions, nor is the world the object of it.70 Rather, 
language is the medium through which we bring our experiences to expression. The ability to 
“reason silently with oneself”71 in order to give an account of things as they appear to us puts into 
play the imagination’s schematizing power, as I previously explained. Hence, just as reason 
depends on the “given circumstances in which it operates,”72 as Gadamer points out, thinking and 
judging acquire their manifest specificity in answer to moral aporias, social problems, and political 
crises arising from the history of which we are a part.  
The ability to say, “This is wrong,” is the sign of the moral courage of individuals who, 
daring to think and to judge for themselves, take a stand. Thinking, Arendt tells us, “deals with 
invisibles, with representations of things that are absent … [whereas] judging always concerns 
particulars and things close at hand.”73 Judging actualizes thought’s liberating effects through the 
ways that the knowledge, insights, and understanding acquired through thinking bear on the 
manner in which we conduct our lives. For Arendt, this realization of the “wind of thought”74 does 
not appear in the form of knowledge. Rather, it acquires its material expression when individual 
moral agents exercise their “ability to tell right from wrong.”75 Conscience and consciousness for 
Arendt are therefore interrelated. Hence, even the self can condemn itself as a murderer in the 
solitude of the silent intercourse where one holds oneself to account for one’s words, works, deeds, 
and acts. 
 
68 Gadamer, Truth and Method, 21; see Paul Ricœur, Lectures on Ideology and Utopia. 
69 Hans-Georg Gadamer, Hermeneutics between History and Philosophy. The Selected Writings of Hans-
Georg Gadamer: Volume I, ed. and trans. Pol Valdevelde and Arun Iyer (London: Bloomsbury, 2016), 
69. 
70 Gadamer, Truth and Method, 450; see Ricœur, The Rule of Metaphor. Ricœur points out that 
representative thought espouses a concept of language that “treats language as Ausdruck, ‘expression’—
that is, as the exteriorization of the interior” (284). 
71 Anselm of Canterbury, cited by Arendt, The Life of the Mind. Volume One, Thinking, 99-100. 
72 Gadamer, Truth and Method, 277. 
73 Arendt, The Life of the Mind. Volume One, Thinking, 193. 
74 Arendt, The Life of the Mind. Volume One, Thinking, 193. 
75 Arendt, The Life of the Mind. Volume One, Thinking, 193. 
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IV. Freedom and Evil 
By turning again to the idea that only good is radical and only exemplary representations 
of the good augment the field of action, I now want to put to the test the notion that the ability to 
tell right from wrong rests more radically on our ontological constitution as capable human beings. 
The power to discriminate between the good that we desire to be and the evil that threatens to lay 
waste to the world has its root in the intermediary condition of the being that we are. We have to 
admit that the enigma of our “plural and collective unity”76 places a limit on a cosmopolitan ideal 
that would be equal to the idea of the humanity of all. At the same time, this enigma sets the 
directive idea of humanity in the place of a deontological principle and a teleological aim. By 
maintaining that the good is given only by example, as I previously outlined in discussing the 
phenomenon of testimony, I accordingly intend to draw out the anthropological root of the ability 
to judge between right and wrong.  
To what do we appeal when, confronted with an unprecedented moral or political crisis, 
no historically extant standard suffices for judging the situation and responding to it? The ability 
to set before the mind ideas that are not given to experience and therefore remain empirically 
unknowable such as God, death, and freedom gives wing to thought. Living experiences, Arendt 
reminds us however, are the guideposts for the activity of thinking. She therefore stresses that 
“[t]hought itself … arises out of the incidents”77 from which it takes its bearing and to which it 
remains bound in order not to lose itself in the heights to which it soars. Moreover, “[w]ho says 
what is … always tells a story.”78 The evaluative textures of the narratives we construct in 
recounting incidents, acts, and events thus constitute the cultural moorings of the capacity for 
thinking more and for judging better the history of the violence directed against the victims of 
social, religious, and political conflicts. 
Why, then, might Arendt have come to believe that evil “is never ‘radical,’ … it is only 
extreme, and [hence] … it possesses neither depth nor any demonic dimension”79? Evil, she insists, 
is thought-defying inasmuch as it frustrates thought by its absence of depth. Conversely, “only the 
good has depth that is radical.”80 Warren Harvey notes that, in responding in this way to Gershom 
Gerhard Scholem’s view of the problem of evil, Arendt holds fast to the idea that “[o]nly the good 
 
76 Ricœur, Fallible Man, 138. 
77 Arendt, Thinking without a Banister, 202. 
78 Arendt, Between Past and Future, 260. Arendt adds that “in this story the particular facts lose their 
contingency and acquire some humanly comprehensible meaning” (261-2); see Hannah Arendt, 
“Introduction. Walter Benjamin: 1892-1940,” in Walter Benjamin, Illuminations. Essays and Reflections, 
ed. Hannah Arendt (New York: Schocken, 1968), 3-55. Arendt remarks that “in society everybody must 
answer the question of what he is—as distinct from the question of who he is” (3). Cf. Walsh, Arendt 
Contra Sociology, 76. 
79 Hannah Arendt, “Letter to Gershom Gerhard Scholem,” in Correspondence—Scholem, Gershom Gerhard—
1963-1964 (Series: Adolf Eichmann File, 1938-1968, n.d.). Accessed May 15, 2021: 
https://www.brainpickings.org/2017/02/07/hannah-arendt-the-banality-of-evil/; see Bethania Assy, 
“Eichmann, the Banality of Evil, and Thinking in Arendt’s Thought,” Contemporary Philosophy, 2021. 
Accessed October 10, 2021: https://www.bu.edu/wcp/Papers/Cont/ContAssy.htm. 
80 Arendt, “Letter to Gershom Gerhard Scholem.” 
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… can be radical.”81 In the case of “those rare individuals who during the Nazi regime bravely 
acted to save Jews,”82 saving one life to save the world in each instance exemplified the idea of 
each human being’s dignity and worth. 
The notion that only good is radical, or that good is more originary than evil, once again 
brings our capacity to respond to moral and political exigencies and demands in ways that, in light 
of our considered convictions, we believe advance the good, right, and just to the fore. Previously, 
I rehearsed how aesthetic experience’s lateral transposition onto the ethical and political planes 
rests on the work’s singularity, exemplarity, and communicability. Like the artist whose audacity 
in responding to a question or problem as she apprehends it leads to the creation of something 
new, the revolutionary’s initiative in answer to political ills and failures sets a new chain of events 
in motion. Natality for Arendt is the ground of this capacity for beginning something new. Not the 
blessing of genius but the givenness—the gift—of existence makes surpassing the real from within 
possible. This possibility bespeaks the ontological constitution of a being who stands neither at the 
beginning nor at the end but is always in medias res. The freedom of new beginnings within the 
history of which we are part is consequently the spring of the power for surpassing congealed 
systems of practices and habits of thought in creatively productive ways. 
By resisting the idea that manifestations of evil could give rise to a summons, Ricœur, like 
Arendt, distinguishes good from evil in a way that refuses to grant evil an originary value. For him, 
only “good gathers together,”83 while expressions of evil infect the social, moral, and political order 
through the contagions they spread. There is therefore no equivalent in the realm of evil to the 
ways that poetry, fiction, and music, for example, refashion the real in accordance with their 
explorations into new ways of thinking, acting, and feeling. Nothing in the realm of evil belongs to 
the order of Nachfolge. Rather, the only model we have of the transmission of evil comes from 
biology, such that “we think [of evil] in terms of contamination, infection, epidemic.”84  Hence, only 
“expressions of the good gather themselves together”85 through the manner in which, in 
apprehending the rule exemplified by the act or life that we admire, we are drawn to follow after 
it (Nachfolge). 
Does a freedom that is responsible for evil in fine inhere in the ontological constitution of 
the intermediary being that we are? We have to admit that the freedom of the power to set a new 
course of events in motion by taking the initiative to act also makes us responsible for the evil 
brought into the world through the violence exercised by one person, group, or nation over 
another. This freedom, Ricœur therefore tells us, “is the ground of evil.”86 By the same token, the 
 
81 Hannah Arendt, The Jew as Pariah. Jewish Identity and Politics in the Modern Age (New York: Grove Press, 
1978), 251; cited by Warren Zen Harvey, “Two Jewish Approaches to Evil in History,” in Steven T. Katz, 
Shlomo Biderman, Gershon Greenberg (eds), Wrestling with God. Jewish Theological Responses during 
and after the Holocaust (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 201. 
82 Harvey, “Two Jewish Approaches to Evil in History,” 201. 
83 Paul Ricœur, François Azouvi and Marc de Launay, Critique and Conviction. Conversations with François 
Azouvi and Marc de Launay, trans. Kathleen Blamey (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), 184. 
84 Ricœur et al., Critique and Conviction, 184. 
85 Ricœur et al., Critique and Conviction, 184. 
86 Ricœur, Fallible Man, XLVI. 
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“avowal of evil is also the condition of the consciousness of freedom”87 incarnate in works, words, 
deeds, and acts that break new paths. It is possible, Ricœur remarks, that we ourselves are neither 
“the radical source of evil”88 nor absolute doers of evil. Yet, even if the source of our contamination 
by evil came from elsewhere, “this other source would still be accessible to us only through its 
relation to us, only through the state of temptation, aberration, or blindness whereby we would be 
affected”89 by it. Hence, evil becomes manifest only in the ways in which it disfigures and distorts 
our relations to ourselves and others in our personal, institutional, and social affairs.  
By placing philosophical anthropology under the aegis of a philosophy of fallibility for 
which the pathétique of misery provides a guide, Ricœur’s decision to tie an ethical vision of the 
world to the effort to understand freedom and evil in terms of each other sets in relief the capacities 
inscribed in the human condition. Among these capacities, the ability to hold oneself to account for 
one’s words and deeds is the hallmark of the responsibility we have to think and to judge for 
ourselves and to respond to the suffering of others. The power one individual, group, or nation 
wields over another is the perverse underside of the recognition of the right of each person to 
exercise their capacities and powers. New beginnings that for Arendt appear in the likeness of 
miracles conversely are signs of the freedom manifest in works, words, acts, and lives that, in 
answer to the evil of violence, attest to the good, the right, and the just that we desire to be. 
Moral catastrophes befall us, Arendt says, only if we assume that we and others are 
intrinsically incapable of judging right from wrong in the face of socially accepted mores, customs, 
and standards that support the abject conduct of criminal political regimes. For her, the inability to 
think is by no means due to some fundamental deficiency but is instead the result of the refusal to 
examine aspects of the world that are questionable. When the “overwhelming majority of the 
German people [who] believed in Hitler”90 fell in line with Nazi directives, the thoughtlessness 
inculcated by a totalitarian system where every command was blindly obeyed smoothed the way 
for replacing one order of values with another. The unsettling question raised by this (anti-)political 
experience for Arendt, however, is not and “should never be ‘Why did you obey’ but ‘Why did 
you support’”91 a command that makes you complicit with the unlawful rule of a criminal regime? 
Equating obedience with consent covers over the responsibility each person has for her own 
conduct. In her postscript to her report on Adolph Eichmann’s trial, Arendt remarks that the 
fundamental problem on which the postwar trials of war criminals touched concerns this one, 
central moral question: are human beings “capable of telling right from wrong even when all they 
have to guide them is their own judgment”92? There were no rules to guide those few who were 
able to tell right from wrong, she says, “because no rules existed [under which] … the 
unprecedented”93 horrors of monstrous acts could be placed. Sittlichkeit, Ricœur adds in this 
 
87 Ricœur, Fallible Man, XLVI. 
88 Ricœur, Fallible Man, XLVI. 
89 Ricœur, Fallible Man, XLVI; see Paul Ricœur, Freud and Philosophy. An Essay on Interpretation, trans. 
Denis Savage (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1970), 547. 
90 Hannah Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem. A Report on the Banality of Evil (New York: Penguin, 1992), 98. 
91 Hannah Arendt, Responsibility and Judgment, ed. Jerome Kohn (New York: Schocken, 2003), 48. 
92 Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem, 294-5. 
93 Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem, 295. 
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regard, “did not prevent Nazism.”94 On the contrary, only “the Moralität of some people, like 
[Dietrich] Bonhœffer and others, based on a certain idea of human beings,”95 stood against the 
violent onslaught of this world-destroying conflagration. 
Can we judge right from wrong apart from an idea of humanity that vouchsafes the dignity 
and worth of every human being? And if we can judge only “by having present in our mind some 
incident and some person, absent in time or space that have become examples,”96 as Arendt claims, 
can we tell right from wrong apart from those exemplary representations that commend 
themselves to us through promoting the good, the right, and the just? Submitting experiences for 
which there is no pre-existing standard to the test of the rule exemplified by the case we call to 
mind gives the wind of thought its force and direction. Refusing to judge at all due to an 
“unwillingness or inability to choose one’s examples”97 is the real stumbling-block to thinking for 
ourselves. The examples we choose and the company we keep are thus manifest expressions of the 
moral and political ideals that we espouse in quest of our own identities and self-worth.  
The impulse that liberates us from the condition of thoughtlessness exploited and 
weaponized by totalitarian, authoritarian, and anti-democratic populist regimes ultimately owes 
its force to the testimony of works, words, deeds, and acts that open the world to us and us to the 
world anew. Every claim to truth by a work or act that shatters habituated conventions and mores 
invites us to think more. The meaning of the work or act is the matter that the activity of thinking 
brings to mind. The love of beauty, wisdom, justice and the like that gives wing to thought is the 
spring of the desire that also sets imagination to work. The freedom inhering in the capacity for 
new beginnings consequently manifests itself in works and acts that augment the real through 
refashioning it from within. Such works and acts attest that only good has depth through 
exemplifying the rule that in each case we are drawn to follow. Only expressions of the good, the 
right, and the just place their notes of sanction on the being that we are. Thought that remains 
bound to living experiences attains its true height in interrogating, demystifying, and vacating 
norms, standards, and mores that overtly or covertly authorize the evil of violence. In turn, the 
ability to say this is wrong sets the quest for the good, the right, and the just at the heart of the 
capacity to respond in apposite ways. 
  
 
94 Ricœur, Philosophy, Ethics, and Politics, 9. 
95 Ricœur, Philosophy, Ethics, and Politics, 9. 
96 Arendt, Responsibility and Judgment, 145. 
97 Arendt, Responsibility and Judgment, 146. 
 Thought and Political Judgment 
 
 
Études Ricœuriennes / Ricœur Studies     




Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958). 
———, Between Past and Future. Eight Exercises in Political Thought (New York: Penguin Books, 1968). 
———, “Introduction. Walter Benjamin: 1892-1940,” in Walter Benjamin, Illuminations. Essays and 
Reflections, ed. Hannah Arendt (New York: Schocken, 1968), 3-55. 
———, “Letter to Gershom Gerhard Scholem,” in Correspondence—Scholem, Gershom Gerhard—1963-1964 
(Series: Adolf Eichmann File, 1938-1968, n.d.). Accessed May 15, 2021: 
https://www.brainpickings.org/2017/02/07/hannah-arendt-the-banality-of-evil/ 
———, The Life of the Mind. Volume One, Thinking (San Diego: Harcourt Brace, 1978). 
———, The Jew as Pariah. Jewish Identity and Politics in the Modern Age (New York: Grove Press, 1978). 
———, Eichmann in Jerusalem. A Report on the Banality of Evil (New York: Penguin, 1992). 
———, Love and Saint Augustine, ed. Joanna Vecchiarelli Scott and Judith Chelius Stark (Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 1996). 
———, Responsibility and Judgment, ed. Jerome Kohn (New York: Schocken, 2003). 
———, The Promise of Politics, ed. Jerome Kohn (New York: Schocken, 2005). 
———, Reflections on Literature and Culture, ed. Susannah Young-Ah Gottlieb (Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 2007). 
———, Thinking Without a Banister. Essays in Understanding 1953-1975, ed. Jerome Kohn (New York: 
Schocken, 2018). 
Bethania Assy, “Eichmann, the Banality of Evil, and Thinking in Arendt’s Thought,” Contemporary 
Philosophy, 2021. Accessed October 10, 2021: 
https://www.bu.edu/wcp/Papers/Cont/ContAssy.htm. 
Alain Badiou, Plato’s Republic. A Dialogue in Sixteen Chapters, trans. Susan Spitzer (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2013). 
Charles Baudelaire, “Correspondences,” in Flowers of Evil, trans. James McGowan (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1993). 
Seyla Benhabib, The Reluctant Modernism of Hannah Arendt (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2000). 
———, “Judgment and the Moral Foundations of Politics in Hannah Arendt’s Thought,” in Ronald Beiner and 
Jennifer Nedelsky (eds), Judgment, Imagination, and Politics. Themes from Kant and Arendt 
(London: Rowman & Littlefield, 2001), 183-204. 
Hans-Georg Gadamer, The Relevance of the Beautiful and Other Essays, ed. Robert Bernasconi, trans. 
Nicholas Walker (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986). 
———, Truth and Method, trans. Joel Weinsheimer and Donald G. Marshall, 2nd ed. (New York: Crossroad, 
1989). 
———, Hermeneutics between History and Philosophy. The Selected Writings of Hans-Georg Gadamer: 
Volume I, ed. and trans. Pol Valdevelde and Arun Iyer (London: Bloomsbury, 2016). 
Roger W. H. Savage 
 
 
Études Ricœuriennes / Ricœur Studies     





Warren Zen Harvey, “Two Jewish Approaches to Evil in History,” in Steven T. Katz, Shlomo Biderman, 
Gershon Greenberg (eds), Wrestling with God. Jewish Theological Responses during and after the 
Holocaust (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007). 
Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Norman Kemp Smith (New York/London: St. Martin’s 
Press/Macmillan, 1929). 
———, The Critique of Judgment, trans. James Creed Meredith (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1952). 
———, Critique of Judgment, trans. Werner S. Pluhar (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1987). 
Plato, “Symposium,” in Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns (eds), The Collected Dialogues Including the 
Letters, trans. Michael Joyce (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962). 
Paul Ricœur, Freud and Philosophy. An Essay on Interpretation, trans. Denis Savage (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1970). 
———, The Rule of Metaphor. Multi-Disciplinary Studies of the Creation of Meaning in Language, trans. 
Robert Czerny, Kathleen McLaughlin and John Costello (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 
1977). 
———, “The Metaphorical Process as Cognition, Imagination, and Feeling,” Critical Inquiry, vol. 5/1 (1978). 
———, Fallible Man, trans. Charles A. Kelbley (New York: Fordham University Press, 1986). 
———, Lectures on Ideology and Utopia, ed. George H. Taylor (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986). 
———, A Ricœur Reader. Reflection and Imagination, ed. Mario J. Valdés (Toronto: University of Toronto 
Press, 1991). 
———, Oneself as Another, trans. Kathleen Blamey (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992). 
———, Figuring the Sacred. Religion, Narrative, and Imagination, ed. Mark I. Wallace, trans. David Pellauer 
(Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1995). 
———, The Just, trans. David Pellauer (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000). 
———, Hermeneutics. Writing and Lectures, Volume 2, trans. David Pellauer (Cambridge: Polity, 2013). 
———, Philosophical Anthropology. Writings and Lectures, Volume 3, ed. Johann Michel and Jérôme Porée, 
trans. David Pellauer (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2016). 
Paul Ricœur, François Azouvi and Marc de Launay, Critique and Conviction. Conversations with François 
Azouvi and Marc de Launay, trans. Kathleen Blamey (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998). 
Roger W. H. Savage, Paul Ricœur’s Philosophical Anthropology as Hermeneutics of Liberation (New York: 
Routledge, 2021). 
Philip Walsh, Arendt Contra Sociology. Theory, Society, and its Science (London: Routledge, 2015). 
Tama Weisman, Hannah Arendt and Karl Marx. On Totalitarianism and the Tradition of Western Political 
Thought (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2014). 
Albrecht Wellmer, “Hannah Arendt on Judgment. The Unwritten Doctrine of Reason,” in Ronald Beiner and 
Jennifer Nedelsky (eds), Judgment, Imagination, and Politics. Themes from Kant and Arendt 
(London: Rowman & Littlefield, 2001), 165-82. 
